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“Can  there  be  a  more  hopeful  way  to  live  historically?”1  (Simon,  2000,  p.  
18).   “[H]ow  might   remembrance,”  Roger   Simon   asked,   “be  understood  
as   a   praxis   creating   the   possibilities   of   new   histories   and   altered  
subjectivities?”(2004,   pp.   186–187).   That   is   a   loaded   question,  
reverberating   with   echoes   of   Simon’s   earlier   commitments   to  
“empowerment”  (  1987),  teaching  against  the  grain  (1992a),  and  counter-­‐‑
commemoration   (1992b,   1993).  Rather   than   remembrance  as   intrusion  –  
being  reminded  of  something  I  might  prefer  to  forget  –  remembrance  is  
in  Simon’s  question  an  expression  of  agency.2  No  voluntaristic  action  by  
a   socially   severed   self,   remembrance   becomes   in   Simon’s   sentence   a  
praxis  in  which  thought  and  action  are  enacted  reciprocally.  And  it  is  not  
self-­‐‑enclosed,  as  what  is  remembered  is  reconstructed  and  she  or  he  who  
remembers   is   also   reconstructed   by   the   encounter.   That   education   is  
“selfformation,”  Simon  was  sure  (1992,  p.  17).3  “[E]ducation  is,   for  me,”  
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Simon  asserted,  “a  basic  resource  for  the  task  of  self-­‐‑constitution”  (1992,  
p.  22).    
To   act   in   remembrance   within   the   amnesia   of   the   present   –   in   a  
culture   of   narcissism   there   is   no  memory   –  means   the   reactivation  of  
the   past.   Reactivation   is  my   term:   in   Simon’s   language,   it   becomes   a  
two-­‐‑pronged  praxis  of  remembrance,  thought  and  “pedagogic  action”4  
that   cultivates   “historical   consciousness”   (1992,   82).5   The   canonical  
curriculum  question  –  what  knowledge  is  of  most  worth?  –  cannot  be  
answered  definitively  (that  is  in  part  why  it  is  pedagogic  provocation)  
but   in  remembrance  knowledge  matters.  Knowledge  has  not  replaced  
with   a   skill   set   standardized   tests   measure   and   the   “global  
marketplace”   sometimes   employs.   In   retrospect,   it   is   painfully   clear  
that  our  progressive  predecessors  were  too  eager  to  replace  knowledge  
as  the  center  of  the  curriculum.6    Knowledge  enables  remembrance  and  
the  reactivation  of  the  past.7    
The  opposite  of  arrest,8   to  activate  means  to  vitalize,   to  breathe   life  
into,   and   be   breathed   into   life.   Reactivating   the   past   is   engagement  
with   alterity   –   specifically   with   the   singularity   of   the   past   in   its  
distinctive  complexity  –   that  sets   in  motion,  well,  we  can’t  know.  The  
history   Simon   and   his   colleagues   choose   to   remember   is   savage:  
massacres,  mutilation,  misery,  each  beyond  comprehension.  Unlike  its  
function   for   the  “history  boys,”   remembrance   is  no  means   to  upward  
mobility.   Simon’s   is   a   more   dangerous   game   than   saying   something  
interesting,   as   those   who   remember   –   not   just   recall   for   an   entrance  
exam  –  can  be  consumed  by  what  is  remembered.  Perhaps  its  state  as  
apparently  past  misleads  us  into  mistaking  the  present  moment  as  still,  
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even   safe.   That   innocence   (or   denial)   renders   the   present   moment  
potentially  ruthless.      
Why,   then,   this   fantasy   of   “new  history”?   Sure   there  will   be   new  
smart   phones   but   history’s   not   going   to   get   any   better.   Is   Simon  
enticing  us  with   that  phrase  –   the  “possibilities  of  new  histories”  –   to  
make   the   risk   seem   worth   taking,   the   risk   of   remembrance   that  
promises   to   unleash   what   is   repressed?   Perhaps   Simon   risked  
remembrance   in   part   because   he   knew   there   can   be   no   future   –   no  
reparation   –  without   reactivating   the   past.   In   remembrance   –   then   at  
least   we   know   we   are   its   progeny   –   there   are   no   innocents,   only  
victims,   however   sweet   the   deal   we’ve   inherited   (with   the   planet  
imperiled,   no   deal   will   prove   sweet   enough).   Did   Simon   risk  
remembrance   to   change   the   subject   from   identity   politics9   to   the  
victims   from   whom   we   cannot   profit,   even   when   we   are   their  
descendants?   Changing   the   subject   means   subjective   reconstruction,  
and   for  me   that   requires   regression   to  a  past  occluded   in   the  present,  
perhaps  in  autobiographical  acts  of  subjective  dissolution.10
    
Ethical   engagement   with   that   alterity   that   is   within   subjectivity  
carries  its  own  risks  of  course.  “It  may  be  objected,”  Simon  knew,  “that  
the  reflexivity  I  suggest  as  being  necessary  to  the  formation  of  a  public  
memory  is  a  narcissism  that  turns  an  engagement  with  history  toward  
a   concern   with   oneself   rather   than   the   concerns   of   others”   (2004,   p.  
197).  Because  remembrance  –  I  use  regression11  to  emphasize  returning  
to   the   past   rather   than   recalling   it   from   the   present   –   means   self-­‐‑
dissolution;  subjectivity  becomes  the  site  for  social  reconstruction,  not  
its   substitute.   Becoming   deceased,   descendants   engage   with   the  
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legacies   they   have   been   bequeathed   by   accidents   of   birth,   self-­‐‑
shattering  as  also  debt  to  the  dead.    
Simon,   Rosenberg,   and   Eppert   emphasize   the   former   when   they  
construe   “remembrance   ...   as   a   strategic   practice   in   which   memorial  
pedagogies   are   deployed   for   their   sociopolitical   value   and   promise”  
(2000,  p.  3).  For  the  sake  of  social  reconstruction  one  engages  in  the  self-­‐‑
shattering  remembrance  regression  engenders.  This  is  no  one-­‐‑way  street  
from  the  present   to   the  past,  as  “remembrance,”  Simon,  Rosenberg  and  
Eppert  point  out,  is  “a  difficult  return,  a  psychic  and  social  responsibility  
to   bring   the   dead   into   presence,   a   responsibility   that   concurrently  
involves   learning   to   live  with,   and   in   relation   to,   loss”   (2000,  p.   3).  The  
presence   of   the   past   –   most   prominently   its   causalities   disinterred  
through   remembrance   –   restructures   the   present12   as   temporal,   as  
inhabited  by  what  we  have  lost  not  only  by  what  we  hope  to  gain.  Not  
only   the   dead   live   again,   but   we   the   living   die,   dissolved   among   the  
dead,   returning   not   unharmed   but   alive,   as   we   could   not   have   been  
before.13    
Remembrance,   then,  means  regression,   living  with/in   loss,   returning  
to  what  was   past,   returning   to   a   present  we  might   not   now   recognize  
because  we  are  different.  Because  the  present  now  slips  past,  we  become  
historical,   conscious   of   our   situatedness   in   what   has   happened   and   is  
happening   still.   Becoming   dated  might   break   the   spell   of   the   screen   in  
front  of  which  we  may  have  forgotten  what  time  it  is;  what  time  is,  as  the  
endless  now  of  technoculture  renders  everything  eternal  in  its  virtuality.  
Becoming   actual   means   becoming   historical,   becoming   attuned   to   the  
distinctiveness  of  historical  moments,   as   John  Toews   (2008)  details.   For  
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both   Kierkegaard   and   Marx,   Toews   (2008)   points   out,   becoming  
historical  meant  subjective  reconstruction:    
Becoming  historical  involved  a  historical  reconstruction  of  
the   current   forms   of   self-­‐‑identification   –   in   this   case,   the  
reflective  egoism  of  postrevolutionary  bourgeois  society  –  
as  a  specific  product  of  human  practices  in  time.  The  goal  
was  to  experience  the  self   that  was  simply  given  as  a  self  
that  was  historically  particular  and  contingent.  Implicit  in  
this  reconstructive  activity  was  a  conception  of  the  self  as  
not  only  product  but  also  producer….  Experiencing  one’s  
own  individual  identity  as  a  historical  product  implied  an  
act,   or   series   of   acts,   that   brought   this   existing   self   into  
being.  (p.  438)  
Reconstruction,   then,   enacts   agency   as   it   engages   the   specificities   of  
historical   determination.14   Remembrance   is   agency,   enabling  
understanding   of   how   our   –   their   –   determination   occurred,  
understanding   that   initiates   non-­‐‑coincidence   with   it.   “A   response   is  
expected,”  Simon  knew,  “everything  must  be  taken  into  account”  (2004,  
p.   184).   We   must   understand   how   history   happened,   and   that  
understanding  presents  us  with  our  next  move.    
True,   the   presence   of   the   past   can   leave   one   entranced   by   what  
cannot  be  undone,  but  Toews’  analysis  implies  that  engaging  with  what  
our  descendants  did   and  what  was  done   to   them   can  make   contingent  
what  had  seemed  set  in  stone.  The  world  may  not  change  but  its  capacity  
to  reproduce  itself  through  us  can.  Racism  remains  but  its  forms  mutate;  
in  certain  places  (psychic15  and  social)  it’s  on  the  run.  In  other  places  it’s  
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dug  in  deep.  Subjectively  speaking,  the  circuit  starting  with  Ham  (or  so  
the   slaveholders   and   segregationists   imagined)   can   get   rerouted   –   yes  
even  defused  in  certain  spheres  –  as  our  soft  wiring  splinters.16  In  acts  of  
subjective  reconstruction  one  moves  between  hope  –  in  Teaching  Against  
the  Grain,  Simon  defines  it  as  “the  acknowledgement  of  more  openness  in  
a   situation   than   the   situations   easily   reveals;   openness   above   all   to  
possibilities”   (1992,   p.   3)   –   and   despair   –   succumbing   to   what   was   as  
what  must  be.17  Resolve   is  not  a   strategy;   it   is   ethical   conviction.   It   is,   I  
suggest,  the  “synthesis”  to  which  “regression”  can  lead.    
No   resolution   of   atrocities,   no   redistribution   of   suffering   or   of   ill-­‐‑
gotten   gains,   resolves   registers   defiance   by   remembering   contingency.  
There’s  no  profit  in  resolve,  no  return  on  investment,  no  “social  justice,”  
as  if  it  –  like  “culturally  responsive  pedagogy”  –  could,  in  one  fell  swoop,  
set   things   right.   History   –   humanity   –   fantasizes   such   redemption   but  
admits   it   is   always   futural.   Like   the   virtual,   the   futural   isn’t   actual.  
Remembrance  knows  that  it   is  the  past  that  is  real.  The  present  is  made  
of   it.   Begrudging   the   present   requires   becoming   historical,   and   that  
means   living   in   the   past.  Which  we   can’t   do,   stuck   in   the  mud   of   the  
moment   we   are.   So   loss   is   our   gain.   Remembrance   means,   Simon,  
Rosenberg  and  Eppert   remind,  “learning   to   live  with   loss,  a   learning   to  
live  with  a  return  of  a  memory  that  inevitably  instantiates  loss  and  thus  
bears   no   ultimate   consolation,   a   learning   to   live   with   a   disquieting  
remembrance”   (2000,   p.   4).   Such   disquiet   –   that   non-­‐‑coincidence   with  
what   is   –   is   the   psychic-­‐‑social   space   of   resolve,   in-­‐‑between   hope   and  
despair.	  	  





1  Surely  this  is  the  crucial  question:  given  its  power  and  horror,  how  can  
the  past  not   ruin   the   future?  Can   remembering   the  murdered   resurrect  
hope  for  a  future  denied  them  but  etched  in  our  remembrance  of  them?  
Simon’s  sentience  leaves  the  question  open,  offering  us  passage  between  
hope  and  despair.  
2  “The  hopeful   [emphasis  added]  person,”  Simon  emphasized,  “does  not  
merely  envisage  this  possibility  as  a  wish;  the  hopeful  person  acts  upon  it  
now   by   loosening   and   refusing   the   hold   that   take-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted   realities  
and  routines  have  over  imagination”  (1992,  p.  3).  
3   “I   am   working   from   the   assumption,”   he   acknowledged,   “that  
education  is  but  one  initiative  in  relation  to  the  process  of  self-­‐‑formation,  
the   means   through   which   people   attempt   to   constitute   themselves   as  
subjects  of  their  own  experience”  (1992,  p.  17).  That  “self”  was  social  and  
historical,  as  “there  can  be  no  ‘fully  realized’  person  beyond  and  outside  
the   history   within   which   the   forms   of   everyday   life   have   been  
constructed”  (1992,  p.  21).    
4  Here   Simon  associates   “pedagogical   action”  with   “symbolic  violence”  
but  his  reflection  upon  the  pedagogue’s  implicatedness  in  students’  “fear  
of   theory”   underscores   his   resolve   to   reconstruct   –   Simon   uses  
“transcend”  –  such  violence  as  a  “pedagogy  of  possibility”  (1992,  p.  98).  
5  “The  historical  consciousness  we  refer  to  here,”  Simon,  Rosenberg  and  
Eppert   explain,   “is   not   simply   a   ‘state   of   mind,’   the   cognitive  
accumulation   that   comprises   one’s   knowledge   of   the  past”   (2000,   p.   2).  
 




Not  “simply”  of  course,  but  it  is,  they  acknowledge,  both  “state  of  mind”  
and   “knowledge.”   While   starting   points   for   Simon,   Rosenberg   and  
Eppert,   they   are   central   points   for   me.   Simon,   Rosenberg   and   Eppert  
emphasize  its  social  nature:  “[we  view  historical  consciousness  as  always  
requiring  another  as  an  indelibly  social  praxis,  a  very  determinate  set  of  
commitments  and  actions  held  and  enacted  by  members  of  collectivities”  
(2000,  p.  2).  
6  “If   the  curriculum  of  our  schools   is   to  serve   its   true   function,”  Harold  
Rugg   wrote,   “it   must   be   reconstructed   on   a   two-­‐‑fold   basis.   Adequate  
provision  must  be  made  for  creative  personal  development,  and  tolerant  
understanding   of   American   life   must   be   erected   as   the   great   guiding  
intellectual   goal   of   education.   Its   reconstruction,   therefore,   must  
concentrate   upon   two   foci   –   child   growth   and   the   dynamic   content   of  
American   civilization”   (1926,   pp.   3-­‐‑4).   While   Dewey   and   many   of   his  
colleagues  appreciated  the   interrelatedness  of   these  two  foci,  here  Rugg  
ignores  that  it  is  academic  knowledge  that  enables  their  cultivation.    
7   At   one   point   Simon   seems   to   devalue,   knowledge:   “What   must   be  
signaled   at   the   outset   then,   is   that   ‘historical   memory’   is   not   to   be  
conceived   singularly   as   a   practice   of   retention,   as   the   recollection   of  
expressed   experiences   or   grounded   narrations   of   past   events.   Quite  
differently,   historical   memory   also   includes   the   potential   for   a   fertile  
commingling   between   present   consciousness   and   the   staging   of  
evidentiary   traces  of  past  presence”   (2000,  p.  10).  The  use  of  “includes”  
shows   Simon   has   not   discarded   “knowledge,”   but   it   is   the  
“juxtaposition”  (see  Simon  2000,  p.  21and  p.  23)  –  a  concept  of  interest  to  
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me   as   well   (2009,   p.   154   n.   13)   –   of   “evidentiary   traces   of   past   and  
present”   –   Benjamin’s   “dialectical   images”   (Simon,   1992,   p.   140)   –  
wherein  remembrance’s  pedagogical  potential  lies.    
8  See  Pinar,  1994,  p.  38.  
9  “This  essentialization  of  experience  within  a  form  of  relationship  called  
identity  politics,”  Simon  (1992,  68)  knew,  “needs  careful  scrutiny.”    
10   This   is,   of   course,   the   first   step   in   the   autobiographical   method   of  
currere,   but   not   the   last,   as   futural   fantasy   (progression),   analysis,   and  
synthesis   follow   in  my   “praxis”   of   educational   experience   (Pinar   1994,  
19-­‐‑27).  I  theorize  its  racial  enactment  in  regression  to  the  so-­‐‑called  Curse  
of   Ham   (2006).   While   Simon   never   uses   this   term   –   he   emphasizes  
instead  history’s  return  to  the  present  rather  than  our  return  to  the  past  
(see,   for   instance,   Simon,   Rosenberg   and   Eppert   2000,   3,   4)   –   he   does  
suggest   that   “zakhor   requires   a   particular   mode   of   attendance,   a  
particular   embodied   cognizance   necessary   to   support   its   pedagogy.  
What  is  at  issue  here  is  the  sensibility  with  which  one  engages  the  stories  
of   others”   (Simon   2000,   17).   It   is   that   sensibility   regression   shatters,  
enabling   its   reconstruction.   LaCapra   (2009,   124)   references   “Walter  
Benjamin’s   notion   of   historiography   as   returning   to   unrealized  
possibilities  of  the  past  that  are  worth  reactivating  in  the  present.”  Again,  
I  argue  that  to  do  so  requires  reactivating  the  past  by  returning  to  it.  
11   Regression   means   reconstruction   in   its   historiographic   sense,   as  
laboring  to  understand  the  past  on  –  in  –  its  own  terms,  supplemented  by  
subjective  engagement  of  varying   intensities  as  one  grapples  with  what  
that  distinctive  past  was.  When  Simon,  Rosenberg  and  Eppert   (2000,   2)  
 




speak  of   “engagement  with   the   traces  of   traumatic  history”   they   imply  
the   intensity   “regression”   allows,   but   they   seem   to   want   memory   to  
“return”  to  the  present  (see  2000,  3),rather  than  us  to  “return”  to  the  past,  
as   regression   encourages.   In   the   third   stage   of   the  method   of   currere   –  
analysis   (following   regression   and   progression)   there   is   “mindful  
attentiveness   to,   learning   from,   and  participation   in   the  memory  of   the  
traces  of  traumatic  history,”  for  Simon,  Rosenberg  and  Eppert  (2000,  3)  a  
matter  requiring  understanding.    
12   It   is   a   matter,   Simon,   Rosenberg   and   Eppert   (2000,   5)   suggest,   of  
“reopening  the  present.”  
13  acknowledge  “the  limits  of  a  consolatory  assurance  that  the  past  can  be  
discursively   integrated   into   coherent   –   and   pragmatic   –   contemporary  
frames  of  social  memory.”  Limits  indeed.    
14  Acknowledging   the  power  of  determination   that   reproduction   theory  
proclaimed,   Simon   (1992,   10)   affirmed   agency:  While   I   do   not   wish   to  
contest  the  outlines  of  this  rather  bleak  picture  nor  diminish  the  need  for  
structural   change,   this   view   of   schools   cedes   too   much.   The   current  
hegemony   over   how   schooling   is   to   be   done   remains   a   project,   not   an  
accomplishment.   Within   the   spaces   that   do   exist   in   certain   schools,  
courses  of  study,  and  classrooms,   this  hegemony  has  been  and   is  being  
contested   by   students,   teachers,   and   parents   who   remain   genuinely  
hopeful   that   pedagogies   which   support   social   transformation   can   be  
realized.”  That  agency  is  not  individualistic  but  formed  and  expressed  in  
solidarity   (see   1992,   66-­‐‑69).   But,   he   noted,   “it   makes   little   sense   to  
consider   the   notion   of   social   forms   abstractly,   outside   the   context   of  
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history”  (1992,  21).  While  not  using  the  word,  “reconstruction”  seems  to  
me   to   be   what   Simon   (1992,   139)   has   in   mind   in   his   pedagogy   of  
possibility,   which   he   links   to   the   work   of   Walter   Benjamin:   “he  
[Benjamin]  begins  to  formulate  the  epistemological  outlines  of  one  aspect  
of   what  might   be   recognized   as   a   pedagogy   of   possibility.   This   was   a  
practice   that   did   not   require   the   obliteration   of   the   past   and   its  
replacement  with  a  new  ‘truth,’  but  rather  a  fundamental  reconfiguration  
[reconstruction]   and   rereading   of   the   documents   of   tradition   in   a   way  
that  might  help  ‘reveal  the  present  as  a  revolutionary  moment’.”  
15   “[The  possibility  of  hope,”  Simon   (2000,  17)  argues,  “depends  on  our  
capacities   for   providing   a   psychic   locus   of   such   stories,   a   locus   that  
requires   we   take   up   the   stories   of   others   with   in   the   pedagogical  
dynamics  of  zakhor.”  
16   Mica   Nava   shows   how   racism   can   mutate   into   eroticism   even  
cosmopolitan.  Racism  remains  but  surely  sex  is  to  preferable  to  violence  
(even  though  the  two  are  hardly  mutually  exclusive).    
17   In  his  study  of   the  cultural  catastrophe  European  settlement  of  North  
America  precipitated,  Lear  (2006,  152)  focuses  on  Plenty  Coups,  the  last  
great   chief   of   the  Crow  nation:   “Plenty  Coups  had   to   acknowledge   the  
destruction  of  a  telos  –  that  the  old  ways  of  living  a  good  life  were  gone.  
And   that   acknowledgement   involved   the   stark   recognition   that   the  
traditional  ways   of   structuring   significance   –   of   recognizing   something  
as  happening  –  had  been  devastated.  For  Plenty  Coups,  this  recognition  
was  not  an  expression  of  despair;  it  was  the  only  way  to  avoid  it.”  Plenty  
Coups  required  no  regression;  he  was  immersed  in  the  past  and  lived  its  
 




self-­‐‑shattering   destruction.   What   was   required   of   him,   and   what   he  
achieved  (as  Lear  makes  plain)  was  facing  up  to  this  crushing  historical  
reality   and   somehow   working   it   through   psychically   and   culturally:  
subjective   reconstruction   provided   the   only   path   to   move   through   the  
ruins.  That  undertaking  –  between  hope  and  desires  -­‐‑  requires  resolve.    
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